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INTENT RULE IN ADEMPTION
cality rule no longer exist.32 In Pederson the court reasoned "Now
there is no lack of opportunity for a physician or surgeon to keep
abreast of the advances in his profession .... "3 The standards re-
quired by state medical licensing boards, the comprehensive coverage
of medical journals, the "detail men" of drug companies, and post
graduate courses serve to keep physicians abreast of national stan-
dards. 4 It is not contended that the facilities in smaller communities
are now equal to those in larger towns and cities, nor that the ability
and methods of treatment are everywhere the same. It is contended,
however, that the older barriers no longer exist that would prevent
any competent physician from knowing the extent of his ability
and the capabilities of his facilities. There is nothing to prevent the
doctor from knowing what skills and facilities are readily accessible
for the proper treatment of the patient. "Increasingly realistic
judges . . . will acknowledge that the legal rule ceases when the
reasons for it cease."1
3 5
HAROLD N. BYNUM
Wills-Ademption by Trustee of Incompetent Testator in
North Carolina-Adoption of the Intent Rule
In Grant v. Banks' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the sale by a trustee of property specifically devised by his ward
prior to incapacitation did not adeem the devise and that proceeds
from the sale still remaining in the estate were recoverable under
"In 1940, in Tevdt v. Haugen. 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183, 188
(1940), the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
"The duty of a doctor to his patient is measured by conditions as they
exist, and not what they have been in the past or may be in the future.
Today, with rapid methods of transportation and easy means of com-
munication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor is
not fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular vil-
lage where he is practicing. So far as medical treatment is concerned,
the borders of the locality or community have, in effect, been extended so
as to include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treatment
may be had which the local physician, because of his limited facilities or
training is unable to give."
" Pederson v. Dumouchel, - Wash. 2d , , 431 P.2d 973, 977
(1967).
'Id. at - , 431 P.2d at 977.
" D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES,
§ 8.06 (1966).
1270 N.C. 473, 155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).
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the doctrine of equitable conversion.' The issue of ademption by
act of a trustee for an incompetent testator was one of first impres-
sion in North Carolina. Prior North Carolina ademption cases are
based on the acts of testator 4 or events happening during the life of
testator" while he retained testamentary capacity.6
In this case the testatrix had executed a will in 1951 providing
for the disposition of her personal property and for the sale of her
homeplace, the proceeds of which were to be distributed to her
nephews and nieces or their heirs. The will further provided that,
subject to the right of the estate to control and possession for two
years, a store and lot owned by testatrix was to go to the Methodist
Orphanage. In 1957 testatrix was struck and seriously injured by
an automobile and required constant medical and custodial care until
her death in 1964. She was adjudged mentally incompetent and a
trustee was appointed. With court approval the homeplace and lot
were sold to provide funds to support the incompetent. Upon de-
pletion of these and other cash reserves permission was obtained to
sell the store and lot devised to the Methodist Orphanage. Of the
90,000 dollars received from the sale of the store and lot, between
40,000 dollars and 50,000 dollars remained in the estate at the time
of testatrix's death. The issue raised in the suit was whether the
specific devise of the store and lot was adeemed by the trustee's sale
or if the remaining proceeds of the sale should go to the orphanage.
The ability of a trustee to adeem property specifically devised by
his ward is the subject of sharp conflict among American courts.
This conflict is largely due to the fact -that some courts have ap-
plied the rule that the intention of the testator must control, so
that ordinarily there would be no ademption, while others take
the view ... that the true test is whether or not the thing spe-
2 d. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95. "Conversion is the fictional change of realty
into personalty or of personalty into realty for equitable purposes." Scott v.
Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 250, 69 S.E.2d 557, 562 (1952). Thus the equitable
conversion doctrine applied here is that the sale proceeds are impressed with
the characteristics of the specific devise so that they might pass to the
specific devisees under the will.
' There are several types of ademption possible in the law of wills, i.e.,
ademption by gift during testator's life, ademption by extinguishment, etc.
See 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1172 (1957); 57 Am. JUR. Wills §§ 1579, 1580
(1948). This note, however, is concerned only with ademption by extinc-
tion of the subject matter.
"E.g., Tyer v. Meadows, 215 N.C. 733, 3 S.E.2d 264 (1939).
6E.g., Rue v. Connell, 148 N.C. 302, 62 S.E. 306 (1908).270 N.C. at 481, 155 S.E.2d at 93.
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cifically bequeathed remains in specie at the time of testator's
death ... .7*
The latter view, known as the English or specie test, is the minority
rule.' The minority jurisdictions reason that if the specific devise
is not in the testator's estate at the time of death, the courts have no
power absent specific statutory direction to change the residuary
estate into the specific devise. The majority follow the view that no
ademption occurs when the trustee of an incompetent testator sells
the property devised because of the inability of the testator to ex-
press his testamentary intent other than as expressed in the will."
Even the majority, however, generally agree that there is an ademp-
tion pro tanto of the proceeds used in the ward's maintenance."
In adopting the majority rule the supreme court relied on
Brown v. Cowper."2 The court there, in construing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 33-32, stated: "The general rule is that, where the real estate of a
lunatic is sold under a statute, or by order of court, the proceeds of
sale remain realty for the purpose of devolution on his death intes-
tate while still a lunatic."' 8 Despite the fact that the above case
applied to an intestate lunatic, the court could "see no reason why
... this rule should not apply to an incompetent testator."'14 Reason-
ing further the court stated:
Trustee and ward is a trust relation in which the trustee acts for
the ward, whom the law regards as incapable of managing his
own affairs. The legal title to the property is in the ward, the
trustee being merely the custodian, manager, or conservator of
the ward's estate. In his limited Capacity .. .the trustee has no
power to change the will of his ward by merely commingling
assets in his hands. To so hold would reach the preposterous
157 AM. JUR. Wills § 1590 (1948).' E.g., Roderick v. Fisher, 97 Ohio App. 95, 122 N.E.2d 475 (1954). See
96 C.J.S. Wills § 1174 (1957); Arnot., 51 A.L.R.2d 770 (1957).
o i Re Ireland's Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931), changed by
statute, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 1399 (1933); accord, Jones v.
Green, (1868) L.R. 5 Ch. 555.
2
0N. WIGGINS, NORTii CAROLINA WILLs § 143 (1964); 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.13. (1952).
" Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 770 (1957); Contra, It Re Mason's Estate, 42
Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005 (1965).
12 247 N.C. 1, 100 .S.E.2d 305 (1957). In this case the guardian of a
lunatic had sold his ward's interest in land with court approval. Upon his
death the heirs at law sought to take the personal property as if it were
realty.
" Id. at 9, 100 S.E.2d at 311.
" 270 N.C. at 484, 155 S.E.2d at 95.
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result of allowing a guardian or trustee to rewrite and alter the
provisions of a will so as to destroy the testamentary intent of
testator.15
Although this reasoning is in line with many recent decisions
on this point'6 it does not necessarily follow that this is the most
just or equitable rule.
In adopting the intent test the court stated that a failure to do
so "would reach the preposterous result of allowing a guardian or
trustee ... to destroy the testamentary intent of testator by merely
commingling funds."' 7 In appellant's brief, however, it was noted
that
it is well to remember in this case that the trustee ... elected to
sell and dispose of the homeplace prior to his sale and disposal of
the downtown property. Had he first sold the downtown property,
the homeplace, which brought $17,500 (an amount much less
than that which is now on hand), would have remained intact.18
Thus by choosing the order in which the various pieces of property
were sold the trustee did in fact decide who would take under the
will. It is difficult to understand how this result is any less "pre-
posterous" as regards testatrix's actual intent.
The court in following the majority rule apparently adopted the
major exception to it,19 i.e., that proceeds of the sale used in the
support and maintenance of the ward are adeemed pro tanto. It
should be noted, however, that such pro tanto ademption was un-
avoidable in that no other funds were available to support the testa-
trix. Should a case arise in which the trustee sells property subject
to a specific devise for support of the ward while "generally de-
vised" property remains intact at death, will the court require the
latter property be given to the specific devisees up to the value of the
specific devise because of the inability of the trustee to change testa-
tor's intent ?2 It would seem logical so to hold under the present rule
" Id. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95, 96.
"0 See, e.g., Forbes v. Burket, 181 So. 2d 682 (Fla. App. 1966); Our
Lady of Lourdes v. Vanator, 422 P.2d 74 (Idaho 1967); Stake v. Cole, 257
Iowa 594, 133 N.W.2d 714 (1965).
' 270 N.C. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95, 96.
s Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 5, Grant v. Banks, 270 N.C. 473,
155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).
- 270 N.C. at 485, 155 S.E.2d at 95. The court allowed only the recovery
of those funds which were not used in the support of the ward or in costs of
administration.2 At least one court has so done. In It Re Mason's Estate, 62 Cal. 2d
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since the court, by denying the trustee the power "to destroy the
testamentary intent of testator" implies a fortiori that the testa-
mentary intent will thus be preserved.
In preserving the testamentary intent the court reasoned that
the doctrine of equitable conversion should apply to the incompetent
testate situation as well as the incompetent intestate situation."'
This reasoning seemingly overlooks one important factor-the will
as an expression of testator's intent as to the ultimate disposition of
his entire estate. In the intestate situation the legislature provides
a will for the decedent. The principle underlying the various classi-
fications delineated by descent and distribution statutes is that those
who generally would be the natural objects of a decedent's bounty
take over those who would not." Had the instant case been an in-
testate situation the Methodist Orphanage would have had no
claim.23 Since it is testate, however, the court holds that the
orphanage takes the money remaining in the estate to the exclusion
of the next of kin. In so doing the court places great emphasis on
the fact that the orphanage was to get a specific devise while the
next of kin were intended to take only the residuary estate. Was
this in fact the intention of the testatrix?
Although this is a problem of ademption rather than construction
of wills, it is helpful to refer to the will to determine whether the
result attained under the majority rule is in accord with testatrix's
intentions-the implied purpose of adopting the rule. Generally the
will must be construed as a whole to ascertain the intent of the
testator.2 4 In the present case testatrix bequeathed the store and
213, 397 P.2d 1005, 42 Cal. Reptr. 13 (1965), there was a specific devise of
testator's home to the son of a friend. After incompetency, the guardian bank
sold the home for testator's support, keeping the 21,000 dollars sale proceeds
in a separate account. At death only 556.66 dollars of this money remained.
Other property in the estate valued at 6,808.08 dollars was to go to the
residuary legatees. In holding that there was no ademption pro tanto of the
specific devise, the court stated that "when specifically devised property
has been sold and the proceeds used to pay debts and expenses, the devisee
may have his gift redeemed from the remainder of the estate." 62 Cal. 2d
at 217, 397 P.2d at 1008, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 16.-1 270 N.C. at 484, 155 S.E.2d at 95.
"See 23 Am. JUR. 2d Descent and Distribution § 10 (1965) ; e.g., Gar-
wols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239 (1930).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -29 (1962).
" E.g., Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 143
S.E.2d 689 (1965); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taliaferro, 246 N.C.
121, 97 S.E.2d 776 (1957) ; Mewborn v. Mewborn, 239 N.C. 284, 79 S.E.2d
398 (1954).
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lot to the orphanage subject to the control and possession of her
estate for two years, the bequest being "made at the request of my
[deceased] husband."25 The will further provided that "the rest and
residue which remains in the hands of my said Executor . . . shall
... be equally divided between [the children of my brothers or their
heirs]"6 Obviously testatrix did not contemplate her future in-
competency at the time she executed the will. Construing the will as
a whole it is extremely doubtful that she intended her nephews and
nieces to be excluded under any circumstances. Even as to the
specific devise she provided that it was to be subject to the right of
the residuary estate to possession for two years. 7 Indeed, by her
very words the testatrix provided for the orphanage at the request
of her deceased husband. Under the intent rule adopted by the
court, however, an entity outside of the family relationship took the
whole of the residuary estate to the exclusion of her family. It was
just such a result which led the New York court to adopt the English
view, saying "an intention to hold... shares of the preferred stock
for the benefit of a stranger, while spending the remainder of his
estate which would naturally go to his children, for doctors, nurses,
and maintenance can hardly be imagined." 2
Perhaps a more equitable rule in situations like the present is the
Scottish rule cited by our court but not followed.2 This rule states
that "no act of a curator bonis can avail to affect the order of his
ward's succession. . . unless it can be shown not only that it was a
proper and necessary act of administration on the part of the curator,
but that it would have been a necessary and unavoidable act on the
part of the ward if sui juris.' '30 Comparing this test with the ma-
jority and minority American doctrines it seems a safe middle
ground in that (1) it does not require ademption every time the char-
acter of the specific devise is changed (minority rule), while (2) it
does not deny ademption every time the change in the devise is
"Record at 13, Grant v. Banks, 270 N.C. 473, 155 S.E.2d 87 (1967).26 Id. at 14.
2'Thus, should not the court have allowed as a minimum the right of the
residuary legatees to possession and control of the remaining money for
two years?
"in Re Ireland's Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 160, 177 N.E. 405, 406 (1931),
changed by statute, NEw Yonx CiviLr PRACTIcE ACT, § 1399 (1933).
29 270 N.C. at 482, 155 S.E.2d at 93.
"o Macfarlane's Trustees v. Macfarlane, 47 Scot. L.R. 266, 269, 1 Scots
L.T.R. 40, 42 (1910); accord, Davidson v. Davidson, 39 Scot. L.R. 106, 9
Scot. L.T.R. 253 (1901).
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caused by act of a trustee (majority rule). This rule would not
give the trustee the power "to destroy the testamentary intent of
testator" because it requires not only that the change be a necessary
act on the part of the trustee but that it be an act which the testator
would have made himself if compos mentis. Applying this rule to the
instant case there would be an ademption of the specific devise and
the heirs would take the residuary estate. Since the store and lot
was the only estate asset left at the time of the sale, the testatrix
would have had to sell the property for support had she been sui
juris.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court followed the great
weight of American authority in adopting the intent test it seems
that the rule adopted did not give effect to the intention of testatrix.
The basic fault in both the majority and minority rules in this
country is their failure to give effect to the will as a whole in de-
termining the intent of testator. In light of this failing the Scottish
rule of necessity would ostensibly bring about a more equitable so-
lution.
JAMES R. CARPENTER, JR.
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